Ukraine is driving Russian forces out of occupied areas in a massive retreat. Vladimir Putin is calling up 300,000 reserves and buying weapons and ammunition from North Korea. More than 1,300 anti-war rioters have been arrested in Russia. Putin is getting desperate. He is threatening to use nuclear weapons. If his troops keep losing he just might resort to tactical nuclear weapons.

When we think of nuclear weapons we tend to think of our nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, our nuclear submarine missiles, and our manned B-52 bombers. These are all long-range delivery systems with large warheads. They are designed to destroy major targets like industrial complexes, military bases and even large population centers.

Strategic weapons are so horribly destructive that it would be foolish to use them. There are so many of them on both sides that if used they could practically destroy the planet. All they could do is exact mutually assured destruction (MAD). Their only purpose is deterrence. If they are ever used they have failed their mission. They are tightly controlled by nuclear launch codes that only our president or adversary’s top leader has access to.

The original nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very large and very heavy. The B-29 bombers carried only one bomb. After World War II new technology advanced to a level that nuclear weapons could be miniaturized so they could be used as tactical battlefield weapons. They could be deployed on artillery and small short-range missiles. They are also much less powerful. Tactical nuclear weapons have never been used.

Battlefield use of small nuclear weapons was advocated by Harvard professor Henry Kissinger in his 1957 book “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” This was long before he became Nixon’s Secretary of State. This book was required reading for a foreign policy course I had at Penn State in the spring of 1962. Kissinger believed that tactical nuclear weapons were more useful than strategic nuclear weapons because they could actually be used if necessary. He noted that an attacking massive force of conventional tanks, tracked artillery, and armored troop carriers could be neutralized by a few small nuclear weapons. This would mean that during the Cold War (1945-1990) we would not have needed to station as many of our conventional troops in West Germany, for example, to deter aggression from the East. The Soviets and communist East Germany were a threat to West Germany.

A few months after my foreign policy course, in October 1962, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a confrontation of strategic weapons. Russia’s missiles could have reached much of the U.S. and our nuclear forces were on alert. There was delicate diplomacy for days before it was resolved. We were glued to the TV at my fraternity. We were relieved when it was over. It was the closest that we had ever come to nuclear war.

Five years later, in 1967, I was serving in the U.S. Army’s 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment in West Germany. We patrolled the barbed wire and watchtower “Iron Curtain” border with communist East Germany. We were stationed at Fulda, the only city near the border. The border area was mostly rural farming villages. We patrolled the “Fulda Gap” which was a level corridor between the Vogelsberg and Rhon mountain ranges into Eastern Europe. This was the most likely route for an invasion from the East. This was the route that Napoleon and Hitler took going into Russia.

The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and later the 11th Armored Cavalry, was mostly a reconnaissance force. We were tasked with constantly monitoring troop movements across the border. We had helicopters, tanks, tracked artillery and armored troop carriers, but we were not a large force. We were greatly outnumbered by the combined forces of East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. If they had ever come across in force they could have wiped us out quickly.

But we had something to counter that. We had tactical nuclear weapons. We had nuclear rounds for our tracked artillery. These howitzers could have neutralized mass formations to buy time until our Infantry and armored divisions could mobilize at the border. Of course there would be collateral damage. Many civilians would have been killed. Even many of us in the 14th could have been killed. This was the reality of confrontation at the border.

We also had nuclear landmines on the border. My German wife’s aunt had a farm on the border and there were mines planted there, to be set off in the event of an invasion. The Russians knew we had these weapons and they knew we would use them.

For years they had tried to get us to sign a “no first use of nuclear weapons” treaty which would have given them overwhelming advantage in conventional forces. They stirred up pacifist groups in West Germany to have us remove our nuclear weapons. They staged “better Red than dead” rallies. We held firm and West Germany became neither Red nor dead. The Russians never crossed the line. World War III could have started in the Fulda Gap. I served only one year at the “Iron Curtain” border, “Freedoms Frontier,” before going to Vietnam.

That brings us to today in Ukraine. Russia has tactical nuclear weapons and so do we. Would it make sense for Putin to use them? Probably not. Ukraine is a big country. Troops are dispersed over a wide area with Ukranian and Russian troops in close proximity. It would kill many Russian troops. Also it would trigger worldwide condemnation. It would not make sense to a rational person but maybe Putin is irrational. Maybe, in desperation, he would seek revenge by targeting Kyiv. Unfortunately we have to live with the threat of nuclear weapons. Let’s hope they are not used in Ukraine.

Bruce Williams is a Warren resident.